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I. INTRODUCTION
Law review analysis of stock subscription law-the law related to
promises to pay to a corporation a stated sum for a specified number
of unissued shares-has been noticeably lacking in recent years.' I
suspect the most prominent reasons for the void center on the feeling
in the academic community that subscriptions are used infrequently
and that in any event the law related to them is settled. The material
that follows demonstrates that both these propositions are false: sub-
scriptions appear to be used with some frequency in the formation of
small corporations, and the law related to them remains complex and
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. Funds for the support of research for this
article were received from the University of Washington Law School Foundation.
1. The most recent publication on this subject is Comment, Legal Effect of Preincorporation
Subscription Agreements in California, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1418 (1968).
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often difficult to locate. This article attempts to provide some guidance
to practitioners who encounter this relatively intractable area of law.
Counsel may encounter questions regarding the validity of a stock
subscription either in litigation or in planning a proposed transaction.
Litigation related to stock subscriptions presents difficult questions as
to which of a number of potentially applicable bodies of law ought to
be applied. Partly because of such complexity, planners typically seek
means of accomplishing transactions without the use of stock
subscriptions.
A. General Observations for Litigators
Counsel trying a case in which the validity of a stock subscription
must be determined encounter a complex pattern of law related to the
subject:
One, stock subscriptions are securities2 and thus are subject to the
fraud3 and registration provisions in federal securities4 and state blue-
sky laws;5
Two, most state corporation statutes6 contain rules regarding at
least certain aspects of stock subscriptions;7
Three, despite such statutes, many issues related to the validity of a
stock subscription must be determined under state common law;8
Four, the cases in many jurisdictions are relatively old and fre-
quently involve attempts by the courts to adapt contract principles9 to
the resolution of a controversy arising out of a public solicitation of
subscriptions;t° and
Five, while most of the recent cases involve closely-held corpora-
2. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 241-42 (1983).
3. For an example of the application of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
to a subscription, see Hidell v. International Diversified Inv., 520 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1975).
4. Under section 2(1) of the Federal Securities Act of 1933, both preincorporation
subscriptions and shares ultimately issued, as securities, require independent registration. L.
Loss, supra. note 2, at 242 (1983). Professor Loss reports that few preincorporation
subscriptions (none in recent years) have ever been registered. Id.
5. For a recent example of the application of a state b'ue-sky law to a subscription, see
Midwest Management Corp. v. Stephens, 291 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1980). For earlier cases. see
Annotation, Applicability of Blue Sky Laws to Preincorporation Subscriptiots, 50 A.L.R.2D 1103
(1956).
6. Generally. the law applied to determine the validity of a stock subscription is the law of the
state of incorporation. E.g., Klapmeier v. Flagg, 677 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1982).
7. See. eg.. infra notes 46, 73 and accompanying text.
8 See. e:g., infra note 21 and accompanying text.
9 See Cataldo. Conditions in Subscriptions for Shares, 43 VA. L. Ri-'v. 353 (1957).
10. E.g.. Coleman Hotel Co. v. Crawford, 3 S.W.2d 1109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (subscribers
were citizens of a town); ee also R. HAMIt TON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
259 (3d ed. 1986).
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tions," few cases apply fiduciary concepts developed in such cases to
the stock subscription problem 2 and fewer still question the relevance
of much of the older case law.
The discussion that follows focuses on issues related to state corpo-
ration statutes and decisions, as little controversy has arisen in recent
years in the securities laws areas.
B. General Observations for Planners
Counsel planning any transaction in which a stock subscription has
been proposed should consider whether use of a subscription is neces-
sary. As a result of securities law requirements and capital market
practices, it appears that subscriptions are seldom efficacious in con-
nection with public solicitations for funds. 13 There is also reason to
consider the utility of subscriptions even in connection with the estab-
lishment of a closely-held corporation. 14 State statutes specifying a
minimum level of subscriptions as a condition of incorporation have
virtually been eliminated. 5 The general movement toward reducing
procedural complexity in the incorporation process continues, with a
concomitant reduction in the expense of incorporation. Counsel
should therefore weigh carefully the strategy of incorporating first, fol-
lowed by use of contracts for purchase of shares, as an alternative to
the use of preincorporation subscriptions.
II. BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUBSCRIPTION
A. Terms
Most statutes do not specify what terms must appear in a share sub-
11. E.g., Cerami v. Dignazio, 283 Pa. Super. 424, 424 A.2d 881 (1980) (three shareholders in
corporation, with two persons asserting rights as subscribers).
12. In Bielinski v. Miller, 118 N.H. 26, 382 A.2d 357, 359 (1978), the court in dictum was
willing to accept greater informality in procedures in the case before it, which involved a close-
corporation.
13. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 242 (1983) reports that it has
been many years since a subscription has been registered. See also I MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT ANN. 348 (3d ed. 1985).
14. Winton, Private Corporate Stock Subscription Agreements, 33 S. CAL. L. REV. 388,
389-90 (1960), suggests that the use of preincorporation subscriptions may lead to the
development of a more concrete organization plan than would otherwise develop. R. JENNINGS
& R. BUXBAUM, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 781 (5th ed. 1979), state that the
case law has been quite critical of this argument.
15. But see the provisions in the recently amended HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-54(11)-(12)
(1985), which requires that the articles of incorporation set forth the names of initial subscribers,
the number of shares subscribed for, the price of each share subscribed, and the consideration (if
other than cash) to be paid.
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scription. t 6 The case law is, for the most part, not very helpful on the
subject.1 7 However, the commentators are generally in accord that a
subscription is an offer or promise to pay to the corporation a stated
sum for a specified number of unissued shares.' 8 Similar language
appears in the few statutes that provide a definition for the term.' 9
Molina v. Largosa20 raises the question of whether a subscription
meeting the minimal common law requirements stated above will
always be valid. Molina had signed a "subscription form" for the
purchase of forty shares of stock (at $50 per share) in a corporation to
be formed. The form described the nature of the proposed corpora-
tion's business but did not set forth either its total capitalization or
Molina's proportionate interest therein. Molina paid for the subscrip-
tion before the corporation was formed. When it was formed, he was
listed as a subscriber. The corporation failed. Molina brought suit for
recovery of his investment, claiming in part that the subscription was
invalid because it did not state the corporation's capitalization or his
proportionate interest therein. The Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's conclusion that the subscription was valid. It said that
both claimed deficiencies could be ascertained simply by adding the
investments of all subscribers as set forth in the affidavit filed with the
articles of incorporation. 2 '
Counsel drafting subscription agreements should note several
aspects of this decision. First, the court did not simply state that the
subscription was valid because traditional common law elements were
present; instead, it apparently required that the subscriber's propor-
tionate interest be determinable from public information related to the
incorporation. Second, most jurisdictions do not require public filing
of the information used by the court. Third, even if such information
is not required as a matter of state corporation law, it seems virtually
16. See REVISED MODEl BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 1.40, 6.20 (1984); MODEl, BUSINESS
CoRu'. ACT §§ 2, 17 (1969).
17. E.g., Brown v. North Ventura Rd. Dev. Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 227, 30 Cal. Rptr. 568. 571
(1963) ("it has been held that any agreement to take stock in a corporation is a subscription");
see also Cornhusker Dev. & Inv. Group, Inc. v. Knecht, 180 Neb. 873, 146 N.W.2d 567. 571
(1966) ("[a]ny agreement by which a person shows an intention to become a stockholder . . is
sufficient as a contract of subscription . . .").
18. E.g.. 4 W. FtETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1363
(rev. perm. ed. 1985); Schwenk, Pre-incorporation Subscriptions: The Oifer Theory And-What Is
An Offer?. 29 VA. L. RI v. 460 (1943).
19. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(b) (1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15. § 1002(22) (Purdon
Supp. 1987); TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 1.02(5) (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-
10-2(18) (1987).
20. 51 Haw. 507, 465 P.2d 293 (1970).
21. Molina, 465 P.2d at 294-95.
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certain that it will be required to satisfy federal and state securities and
antifraud rules.
B. Formal Requirements
Many statutes at one time required subscriptions to be on, or con-
tained in, specified forms.22 Such requirements have generally been
removed as legislatures have attempted to simplify the incorporation
process. Courts, free of legislative restrictions, have generally ruled
that "in the absence of statute or charter provisions to the contrary,
stock subscriptions may be written or oral or in any form that would
satisfy the requirements of a valid contract. '23
The diminished emphasis on use of precise forms or language in
connection with a subscription appears to have led to increased litiga-
tion concerning the characterization of preincorporation agreements
as subscriptions. A recent case, Penley v. Penley, 24 illustrates the point
and the continuing importance, at least for some purposes, to be sure
that an agreement is a "subscription." It also illustrates just how diffi-
cult it is for courts to determine whether an agreement entered into by
participants in a closely-held corporation constituted a subscription.
For a number of years, Mrs. Penley had owned and operated a Ken-
tucky Fried Chicken franchise. She fell ill and obtained her husband's
full-time participation in the business. For ten years, the business was
operated in the wife's name, with the husband as an employee. In
1977, she decided to incorporate the business. In that connection, she
orally promised her husband forty-eight percent of the shares of the
proposed corporation (on the assumption she would also get forty-
eight percent, their son the remaining four percent). The incorpora-
tion took place after the couple's divorce. The wife refused to transfer
forty-eight percent of the shares to the husband. He sued; the jury
found that the husband was entitled to the shares.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed.2 ' Relying on the
statutory definition of a preincorporation subscription,26 the court
22. R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 756- 57 (unabridged
3d edi 1959).
23. White County Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Searey Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 241 Ark. 878,
410 S.W.2d 760, 763 (1967); see also Molina, 465 P.2d at 294 (in the absence of statute, "no
particular form is required if the intent of the parties can be collected from the writing").
24. 65 N.C. App. 711, 310 S.E.2d 360 (1984), rev'd, 314 N.C. 1, 332 S.E.2d 51 (1985).
Another recent case with similar facts is Zukowski v. Dunton, 650 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1981).
25. Penley, 310 S.E.2d at 368.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(a) (1982) states that a preincorporation subscription is "a
promise or contract to take shares in a corporation to be organized and to pay the agreed price
thereof to the corporation or others for its benefit."
Washington Law Review
concluded that the agreement was essentially a preincorporation sub-
scription, and as such, was unenforceable for lack of a writing. 27 The
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the trial court's
verdict for the husband. With respect to the subscription issue, the
court said that the action was not one in which the wife was attempt-
ing to enforce the husband's promise to take shares. The action
instead was an attempt by the husband to enforce the wife's promise to
issue shares to the husband.2 8
Restated, the supreme court apparently concluded that the ultimate
question in the case was whether the husband had acquired a property
interest in the franchise prior to the oral agreement. The court implies
that had the husband acquired such an interest, the agreement would
have been considered a subscription-apparently because the husband
would have been a transferor of property to the corporation for shares.
The court concluded that the husband had not acquired an interest in
the franchise before the agreement. Thus, it held that only the wife
could enter into a subscription agreement with the corporation
exchanging the franchise for shares, and that the husband's rights
came only from her oral agreement to transfer some of the shares to be
received on completion of her subscription to him.
This analysis is similar to that involved in certain tax questions aris-
ing from transfers of property to a controlled corporation.29 One can-
not escape the feeling that form is critical to such transactions, and
that careful drafting and documentation are a must whenever sub-
scriptions are used in the incorporation of a going business.3 0
27. Penley, 310 S.E.2d at 365. The court also held that even if the agreement could be
characterized as a shareholder's agreement for the corporation to be formed, tt would be
unenforceable for lack of a writing under N.C. GEN. STA'i. § 55-73(b) (1982).
28. Penley v. Penley. 314 N.C. 1. 332 S.E.2d 51. 63 (1985). The court considered the
husband to have elected to pursue his claim upon the oral agreement to convey an interest in the
corporation. Thus, it did not view the agreement as a shareholders' agreement. The shareholder
agreement issues in the case are discussed in Note. Shareholder Agreement-Oral Agreements fi
Close Quarters, 72 WAKE FOREST L. Ri v,. 147 (1987).
29. I.R.C. § 351 (1986) requires for nonrecognition of gain that transferors of property to a
corporation must receive only stock or securities and must be in control of the corporation
immediately after the transfer. The issue of whether a person designated under sarious
arrangements to receive shares in a new corporation is a transferor of property has arisen with
some frequency. See B. BITTKFR & J. Ets sici, Fti)iFR \1 INCOME. T,\XATION O
CORPORVrIONS ANi) SHARA.iO I)DtRS 3-42 to 3-43 (4th ed. 1979).
30. Thus, as in the tax area, it may be best to have a conveyance of an undivided interest in
the business to be incorporated prior to entering into subscriptions.
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C. Writing Requirements
Counsel preparing subscription agreements should be aware of stat-
utory requirements that subscriptions must be written, and of the legal
uncertainties that prevail in the absence of a writing. Fourteen states
have statutes that provide that a subscription for stock (made before
or after incorporation) may not be enforced against the subscriber
unless in writing and signed by the subscriber.3 Five more states have
statutes that provide that at least certain subscriptions will not be valid
if not in writing.3" Texas and Utah define a subscription in part to be a
memorandum in writing.33
The remaining states, following the lead of the Model Business Cor-
poration Act34 and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act,35
have no corporation statute requiring that subscriptions be written.
Such a requirement may nevertheless be imposed by other statute of
frauds provisions operative in those jurisdictions. Thus, the limited
number of cases that have construed article 8-319 of the Uniform
Commercial Code36 have applied it to subscriptions for shares.37 In
addition, the most recent decisions reviewing the long-standing con-
flict 38 regarding the application of a state's general statute of frauds to
31. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-017(B) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-4-103(5) (1986);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 166 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.051(2) (West 1977); GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-2-83(b) (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6416 (Supp. 1986); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 21.200(305)(1) (Callaghan 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.403(2) (West 1985); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW art. 5, § 503(b) (McKinney 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-62(1) (1985); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1047 (West 1987); and S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-9-60(b) (Law. Co-op. 1987)
contain provisions substantially identical to the text. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-3(2) (West 1987)
provides that a subscription agreement will not be enforceable unless it satisfies the requirements
in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:8-319 with respect to a contract for sale of securities. (The statute of
frauds provision in article 8 of the U.C.C. (article 8-319) is discussed in text immediately
following.) NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.225 (1967) provides that only a written contract of
subscription for stock gives rise to personal liability of the subscriber for unpaid amounts.
32. Unless otherwise noted, the statutes require that both preincorporation and
postincorporation subscriptions be written. IDAHO CODE § 30-1-17 (1980) (only
preincorporation subscriptions); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:71(A) (West 1969); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13A, § 505(1) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(b) (1982); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23A.08.140 (1985) (only preincorporation subscriptions).
33. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 1.02(5) (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-2(18)
(1987 & Supp. 1987).
34. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 17 (1969).
35. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.20 (1984).
36. U.C.C. § 8-319 (1977) (Statute of Frauds).
37. See Putnam v. Williams, 652 F.2d 497, 501 (5th Cir. 1981) (by implication); Cooper v.
Vitraco, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 239 (D.V.I. 1970).
38. Compare Peninsula Leasing Co. v. Cody, 126 N.W. 1053 (Mich. 1910) (holding
subscriptions not within the general statute of frauds) with Spencer v. McGuffin, 190 Ind. 308,
130 N.E. 407 (1921) (holding subscriptions within the general statute of frauds).
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subscriptions have decided in favor of application.39
A final matter highlighted by recent decisions is the uncertainty that
arises when a subscription does not comply with a writing require-
ment. Thus, the court of appeals' decision in Penley v. Penley inter-
preted statutory language that an oral agreement was invalid to mean
that the subscriber had no right to enforce the agreement.4" On the
other hand, a New York case interpreted a provision declaring that a
subscription for shares would not be enforceable unless written to
mean that the lack of a writing would be a defense against enforce-
ment by the corporation of the subscription. The lack of a writing,
however, would not preclude the subscriber from suing the corpora-
tion for rights under the subscription.4' Yet another case interpreted
language in the Texas definition of a stock subscription ("a memoran-
dum in writing ' 4 2) to mean that the rights of a subscriber desiring to
enforce an oral agreement were to be determined under general con-
tract law, rather than under the corporation statute.43 Finally, there
are relatively recent decisions upholding oral subscriptions with no
discussion of the statute of frauds issue.'
III. EFFECT OF PREINCORPORATION SUBSCRIPTIONS
The courts in early cases involving the effect of preincorporation
subscriptions received no help from state corporation statutes. Search-
ing for doctrinal precepts, they turned to contract law principles of
offer, acceptance and consideration.45 Those concepts led a majority
of courts to conclude that a preincorporation subscription was a con-
tinuing offer by the subscriber which could be revoked at any time
prior to the formation of the corporation and acceptance by it of the
39. See Cooper v. Vitraco, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 239 (D.V.I. 1970).
40. Penley v. Penley, 65 N.C. App. 711, 310 S.E.2d 360. 365 (1984). rev'd on other grounds.
314 N.C. 1, 332 S.E.2d 51 (1985).
41. Beck v. Motler, 42 A.D.2d 1020, 348 N.Y.S.2d 397. 399 (1973). To the same effect are
Putnam v. Williams, 652 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1981) (interpreting similar Georgia statute): Super
Valu Stores, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank. 463 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Ga. 1979) (same. with
qualification that once stock had been issued, suit was permissible against the subscriber). See
also Duncan v. Brookview House, Inc.. 262 S.C. 449. 205 S.E.2d 707 (1974) (despite statute
making oral subscriptions unenforceable, oral subscription enforced against subscriber on
grounds that active role in formation and operation of the corporation estopped such defense)
42. Ti~x. Bus. CORP. Aci ANN. art. 1.02(5) (Vernon 1980).
43. Jatoi v. Park Center, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
44. E.g.. Bielmski v. Miller. 118 N.H. 26, 382 A.2d 357 (1978).
45. See H. BAI I ANrIN. CORPORATIONs 444-45 (rev. ed. 1946) (argues such concepts %%ere
inadequate to provide a sensible answer to the business problems giving rise to preincorporation
subscriptions).
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subscription.46 A minority of courts used the same principles to con-
clude that subscriptions entered by a number of subscribers resulted in
a contract between the subscribers that the subscriptions would not be
revoked. Under this view, the subscriptions were irrevocable offers to
the corporation unless cancelled by the consent of all subscribers
before acceptance by the corporation.47
These common law principles are relevant today in only a handful
of states.48 The vast majority of state corporation statutes have
adopted rules modeled on the minority common law position: prein-
corporation subscriptions are irrevocable for a stated period (typically
six months), unless otherwise provided by the subscription or unless
all of the subscribers consent to the revocation of the subscription.49
46. Collins v. Morgan Grain Co., 16 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1926), contains a classic statement of
the analysis. For a more recent application, see Brown v. United Community Nat'l Bank, 282 F.
Supp. 781 (D.D.C. 1968).
47. Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Davis, 40 Minn. 110, 41 N.W. 1026 (1889), is the
classic statement of this position.
48. California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ohio, and Pennsylvania
have no statute making preincorporation subscriptions irrevocable.
49. The statement in text is a paraphrase of the provision in MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 17 (1969) (which states a period of six months). REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 6.20(a) (1984) (which also states a period of six months) is similar, except that the first unless
clause says "unless the subscription agreement provides a longer or shorter period .... "
The following 39 states and the District of Columbia have provisions similar to the text
statement and a stated period of six months: ALA. CODE § 10-2A-34 (1980); ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.05.087 (1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-605A (Supp. 1987) (Revised Model Act provision);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-4-103(1) (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 165 (1983) (adds subscription
may be revoked by consent of corporation); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-315(a) (1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.05 1(1) (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-83(a) (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-
17 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-17 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para 6.20 (Smith-Hurd 1985);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1- 26-1 (Burns Supp. 1987) (Revised Model Act provision); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 496A.16 (West 1962); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6415 (1981) (adds subscription may be
revoked with consent of corporation and states section does not limit defenses available in an
action for enforcement of a contract); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.085(1) (Baldwin 1983); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 505(1) (1981) (also applies to postincorporation subscriptions);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(305)(2) (Callaghan 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.403(2) (West
1985) (also applies to post incorporation subscriptions; restates the unless clauses to read "unless
the subscription agreement provides for, or unless all of the subscribers consent to, an earlier
revocation"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-31 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-I-603(1) (1985);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2016 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.220(4) (1967); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 293-A:17(I) (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-3(1) (West Supp. 1987) (adds to six
month period "if no certificate of incorporation shall be filed within such period" and provides 60
day period of irrevocability following incorporation); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-17 (Supp. 1987);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(c) (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-62(2) (1985) (same as
Minnesota); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1046 (West Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-16(a)
(1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-9-60(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-3-19
(1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-6-201(a) (1984) (Revised Model Act provisions); TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 2.14A (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-16 (1987); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 1864(a) (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-642A (1985) (Revised Model Act
provision); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.140 (1987); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-80 (1982); Wis.
Washington Law Review Vol. 63:21, 1988
Counsel advising clients regarding preincorporation subscriptions
for a corporation to be formed in the handful of states without statu-
tory provisions must, of course, determine the state court's position on
the disputed rules.5 If the jurisdiction adheres to the majority posi-
tion,"1 or if the issue is in doubt, 2 counsel must then evaluate the risk
presented in the proposed transaction by possible revocation of prein-
corporation subscriptions. If the risk is significant, counsel may wish
to reconsider the use of preincorporation subscriptions (as against
incorporating first and then arranging for subscriptions) or the use of
numerous devices suggested by commentators to avoid the risk of rev-
ocation of preincorporation subscriptions.
5 3
IV. ACCEPTANCE OF SUBSCRIPTIONS
The courts' use of contract principles to resolve subscription contro-
versies early led to the requirement that a subscriber's offer had to be
accepted by the corporation before the subscriber was considered a
shareholder and was liable for the subscription. 4 The requirement has
produced a significant amount of litigation, primarily related to
attempted revocations of preincorporation subscriptions, as to what
actions by the corporation constituted "acceptance." A majority of the
cases5 5 considering the issue require either an express acceptance of
the subscription by corporate agents, 6 or conduct by such persons
STAT. ANN. § 180.13(1) (West 1957); WYO. STAT. § 17-1-114(a) (West 1987); Oregon Business
Corporation Act, ch. 52, § 37(1), 1987 Or. Laws 43, 51 (Revised Model Act provision).
Two states, Maryland and New York, provide a period of irrevocability of three months. MD.
CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-202(a) (1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 503(a) (McKinney
1986). Two other states. Arizona and Louisiana, provide a period of irrevocability of one year.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-017A (1977) LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:71B (West 1969).
50. The cases are discussed in 4 W. FLETCHER. supra note 18, §§ 1424-1427: Schwenk. supra
note 18.
51. Prominent examples of decisions adhering to the majority position by courts in states
without statutes are Moser v. Western Harness Racing Ass'n. 89 Cal. App. 2d 1, 200 P.2d 7
(1948); Hudson Real Estate Co. v. Tower, 156 Mass. 82, 30 N.E. 465 (1892).
52. An additional concern may be presented by dictum in Hidell v. International Diversified
Inv., 520 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1975). The court said that a subscription for shares not authorized
by the articles of incorporation filed by the corporation is no longer binding on the subscriber or
the corporation, despite the Illinois statute making preincorporation subscriptions irrevocable for
six months. The authority cited for this proposition predated the Illinois statute. Thus. the
dictum seems questionable.
53. See C. ROHRLICH. ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISIS
§ 5.07[l] (5th ed. 1975).
54. E.g., Bryant's Pond Steam-Mill Co. v. Felt, 87 Me. 234, 32 A. 888 (1895).
55. See 4 W. Fi.FICHI-R, supra note 18, § 1406.
56. Recent examples include United States v. Parker, 376 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1967) (directors'
resolution stated acceptance); Brown v. United Community Nat'l Bank. 282 F. Supp. 781
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that implies acceptance. 7 A much smaller group of cases holds, in
accord with the commentators' view,58 that acceptance can be shown
simply by formation of the corporation. 9 It is generally agreed that
no notice of the acceptance need be given to the subscriber unless
required by the terms of the subscription.6"
A limited number of states address the issue of acceptance by stat-
ute. Four states provide that the filing of articles of incorporation by
the secretary of state shall constitute acceptance by the corporation of
preincorporation subscriptions.6 Three states require or imply that
directors or other corporate agents must accept preincorporation sub-
scriptions in order for the subscriptions to be binding on subscribers.62
In addition, three states require that directors or corporate agents
must accept postincorporation subscriptions.63
(D.D.C. 1968) (corporation wrote letter saying its board of directors had allocated shares to
plaintiff's subscription).
57. Recent examples include Molina v. Largosa, 51 Haw. 507, 465 P.2d 293 (1970) (explicitly
rejects acceptance as a result of formation of the corporation; found acceptance by corporation in
the listing of Molina's name in affidavit of subscribers filed on incorporation); Becker v. Tower
Nat'l Life Inv. Co., 406 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1966) (acceptance found in course of conduct of
corporation); Cornhusker Dev. & Inv. Group v. Knecht, 180 Neb. 87, 146 N.W.2d 567 (1966)
(approves implied acceptance by recognizing subscriber as a shareholder); Bielinski v. Miller, 118
N.H. 26, 382 A.2d 357 (1978) (acceptance found from listing of plaintiff as a shareholder on the
corporation's tax returns).
58. E.g., H. BALLANTINE, supra note 45, at 447-48.
59. See, e.g., Moser v. Western Harness Racing Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 1, 200 P.2d 7 (1948);
Samia v. Central Oil Co., 339 Mass. 101, 158 N.E.2d 469 (1959) (by implication).
60. E.g., Hawley v. Upton, 102 U.S. 314 (1880).
61. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 6.20 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:71C (West 1969)
(after corporate existence has begun, subscriptions may be enforced by the corporation); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1207 (Purdon 1967) (subscribers shall be shareholders); TEX Bus. CORP.
ACT ANN. art. 2.14B (Vernon 1980) (acceptance only of subscriptions on list filed with articles of
incorporation; failure to include a preincorporation subscription therein is rejection). The
Louisiana statute was interpreted by the court in Prejean v. Commonwealth for Community
Change, Inc., 503 So.2d 661 (La. Ct. App. 1987), to mean that on incorporation,
preincorporation subscriptions will no longer be revocable absent grounds for rescission.
62. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.175(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987) (directors have power to accept or
reject subscriptions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-3(l) (West Supp. 1987) (subscriptions must be
accepted or rejected by directors, unless articles of incorporation or bylaws require shareholder
action); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(b) (1982) (subscription becomes enforceable upon acceptance
by the corporation).
63. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.175(1) (Vernon 1987) (directors have power to accept or reject
subscriptions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-3(1) (West 1987) (subscriptions must be accepted or
rejected by directors, unless articles of incorporation or bylaws require shareholder action); TEx.
Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 2.14C (Vernon 1980) (acceptance must be by director's resolution or
by written memorandum ofacceptance executed by person authorized by directors and delivered
to subscriber).
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V. POSTINCORPORATION SUBSCRIPTIONS
Most of the litigation involving postincorporation subscriptions has
centered on one question: when did the subscriber become entitled to
the rights,64 or subject to the obligations, 6 of a shareholder? Gener-
ally, the answer is that the subscriber becomes a shareholder when the
subscription offer is accepted.6 6 Such result is not affected by evidence
that the subscription is not yet paid 61 (at least in the absence of
laches). 68 Nor is such result affected by the failure of the corporation
to issue certificates for the subscribed shares.69
The general rule is, however, subject to a major exception if the law
of the state of incorporation accepts the executory contract doctrine.
The doctrine, articulated in Stern v. Mayer,7 0 confines subscriptions to
purchases in which the parties' intent is to make the purchaser a
64. Subscribers have asserted diverse shareholders' rights: First, the right to examine
corporate books (Babbitt v. Pacco Investors Corp., 246 Or. 26, 425 P.2d 489 (1967)); second, the
right to transfer the shares to be received (Van Noy v. Gibbs, 7 Utah 2d 70, 318 P.2d 351 (1957));
third, the right to bring a derivative action (Norris v. Osburn, 243 Ga. 483, 254 S.E.2d 860
(1979)); Rank v. Lease Assocs., Inc., 45 Wis. 689, 173 N.W.2d 713 (1970)); and fourth, the rights
to vote on a sale of assets and initiate a dissolution action (Golden v. Oahe Enters., Inc., 90 S.D.
263, 240 N.W.2d 102 (1976)). See also United States v. Parker, 376 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1967)
(question of whether shares to be issued on a subscription counted as outstanding shares for
purposes of I.R.C. § 1239 (1954)).
For a comparison, see Redemer v. Hollis, 347 So.2d 48 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (subscriber who
had paid subscription price was not a registered owner of shares, and thus was not entitled to
inspect corporate books where corporation had no authorized, unissued shares available).
65. E.g.. Martin v. Schuler, 573 P.2d 260 (Okla. 1977).
66. E.g., H. BALLANTINE, supra note 45, at 450. As Ballantine notes, a corporation may
solicit subscriptions by means of an offer of shares to any person who will subscribe. In such a
case, the act of the subscriber making the subscription is the acceptance. E.g., Smith %. General
Motors Corp., 289 F. 205 (6th Cir. 1923). In the more typical case of a corporation soliciting
subscribers for offers to the corporation, acceptance generally comes by corporate action.
However, in some jurisdictions, the acceptance must be communicated to the subscriber in order
to be effective. See Jatoi v. Park Center, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
67. E.g., Babbitt v. Pacco Investors Corp., 246 Or. 261, 425 P.2d 489 (1967).
68. Compare Welborne v. Preferred Risk Ins. Co., 232 Ark. 828, 340 S.W.2d 586 (1960):
Gerber v. Ty-Data, Inc., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 898, 370 N.E.2d 445 (1977) and Buchele v. Pinehurst
Surgical Clinic, P.A., 80 N.C. App. 256, 341 S.E.2d 772 (1986), aff'd, 318 N.C. 503, 349 S.E.2d
579 (1986) with Prejean v. Commonwealth for Community Change, Inc., 503 So.2d 661 (La. Ct.
App. 1987) (laches held inapplicable despite passage of nine years from date of incorporation)
and Goldstein v. Widett, 360 Mass. 126, 272 N.E.2d 220 (1971) (subscriber permitted to enforce
a four-year-old subscription; subscriber had not abandoned subscription and projects were very
slow in getting started).
69. E.g.. Rank v. Lease Assocs.. 45 Wis. 2d 689. 173 N.W.2d 713 (1970) Howeser. as the
court notes, some statutes require that only registered shareholders are eligible to bring a
derivative action. Thus, the court denied the subscribers' right to bring such an action.
70. 166 Minn. 346, 207 N.W. 737 (1926). Other cases taking the executory contract view are-
Burke v. Walker, 124 N.J. Eq. 141, 200 A. 546 (1938): Boroseptic Chem. Co. v. Nelson. 53 S.D.
546. 221 N.W. 264 (1928). Crichfield-Loeffler, Inc. v. Taverna, 4 N.J. Misc. 310. 132 A. 494
(1926), decided three days before Stern v. Mayer. held that a postincorporation agreement to
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shareholder prior to full performance of the purchase agreement. If
the agreement demonstrates that the parties' intent is to preclude exer-
cise of significant shareholder rights until full performance,71 the
agreement is said to be an executory contract for sale of stock. Once
that determination is made, the subscriber does not become a share-
holder until the full purchase price has been paid,72 the corporation
loses the right to collect unpaid installments in the event of insol-
vency,73 and the corporation may be limited on suits for default in
payment of installments to the fair market value of the shares.74
Developments since the decision in Stern v. Mayer appear to leave
the executory contract doctrine operative in only a few jurisdictions.
Three states have adopted statutes that explicitly reject the executory
contract doctrine. 75  Language in the Model Business Corporation
Act, 76 and numerous other statutes,77 has been interpreted78 to change
at least certain aspects of the doctrine. The Revised Model Business
Corporation Act subjects subscription agreements entered into after
incorporation to its provisions regulating share issuance and sub-
scriber's liability therefor.79 Such provision thus appears to abolish the
executory contract doctrine.80 No case since 1940 appears to have
applied the doctrine. Indeed, the doctrine was explicitly rejected in
purchase shares was an executory contract (rather than a subscription) because the agreement
did not negate the possibility that the shares involved were treasury shares.
71. The court in Stern v. Mayer, 166 Minn. 346, 207 N.W. 737 (1926), found such intent in
the name of the instrument ("application for stock" instead of "subscription"), lack of facts
indicating the corporation intended to consider the purchaser as a shareholder prior to receipt of
payment, annual installments (instead of calls at discretion of directors), reservation of option to
forfeit, and inclusion of interest on unpaid installments in the agreement.
72. E.g., Boroseptic Chem. Co. v. Nelson, 53 S.D. 546, 221 N.W. 264 (1928).
73. E.g., Stern v. Mayer, 166 Minn. 346, 207 N.W. 737 (1926).
74. E.g., Crichfield-Loeffler, Inc. v. Taverna, 4 N.J. Misc. 310, 132 A. 494 (1926).
75. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(305)(3) (Callaghan 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-3(7)
(West Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(a) (1982). The latter thus reverses the results in
Burke v. Walker, 124 N.J. Eq. 141, 200 A. 546 (1938), and Crichfield- Loeffler, Inc. v. Taverna, 4
N.J. Misc. 310, 132 A. 494 (1926).
76. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 17 (1969).
77. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 503(c) (McKinney 1986).
78. Penn-Allen Broadcasting Co. v. Traylor, 389 Pa. 490, 133 A.2d 528 (1957). The court
holds that the statutory language -[u]nless otherwise provided in the subscription agreement,
subscriptions for shares, whether made before or after the organization of the corporation, shall
be paid ... as ... determined by the board of directors..." changed prior case law and meant
that postincorporation subscriptions had to be paid in full despite a drop in market value.
79. REvISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.20(e) (1984).
80. The Committee Comment makes no reference to such effect. Indeed, the Comment
stresses that postincorporation subscriptions are contracts between the subscriber and the
corporation, and that they may contain mutually acceptable provisions subject to section 6.21.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT ANN. § 347 (3d ed. 1985). Nevertheless, the Committee's
reference to section 6.21 brings with it liability to pay the consideration for which the shares were
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the latest case in which it was asserted, Martin v. Schuler,8 and it has
been implicitly rejected by a large number of subscription cases . 2
In the few states in which the executory contract doctrine still
applies, counsel planning postincorporation subscriptions must be pre-
pared to draft agreements that fully set out the subscriber's, and the
corporation's, rights and obligations.
VI. ENFORCEMENT OF SHARE SUBSCRIPTIONS
A. Setting Terms of Payment and Making Calls
With the exception of California,83 all states and the District of
Columbia have statutes related to the process of setting payment terms
for subscriptions and making a call for such payments.84 Following
authorized to be issued (under section 6.22). Such result is a rejection of the executory contract
doctrine.
81. 573 P.2d 260 (Okla. 1977). Earlier cases disagreeing with Stern appear in H.
BALLANTINE, supra note 45, at 452-53.
82. See cases in Comment, supra note 1, and Sprangers v. Interactive Technologies, Inc., 394
N.W.2d 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (postincorporation letter agreement for the purchase of
shares upon the completion of a public offering interpreted as stock purchase agreement;
purchaser held to be a shareholder at time when company accepted payments under the
agreement).
83. Discussion of the changes made by the 1977 revision of the California Corporations Code
and of the California common law appear in 1 H. MARSH, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW
§ 5.23 (2d ed. 1986); see also H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
LAWS § 44 (4th ed. 1987).
84. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-34 (1980); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.090 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 10-017C (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-605B (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-4-103(2)
(1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-342(a) (West Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 163
(1983) (see note below); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-315(b) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.051(3)
(West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-83(c) (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-17 (1985); IDAHO
CODE § 30-1-17 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 6.20 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-26.1(b) (West Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.16 (West 1962); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-6413 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.085(2) (Baldwin 1983); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:71D (West 1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 505(3) (1981); MD. CORPS. &
ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-202(c) (1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 22 (Law. Co-op. 1979);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(306) (Callaghan 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.403(3) (West
1985); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-31 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.175(2) (Vernon 1987);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-603(2) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2016 (1983), NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 78-220(1) (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:17(II) (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:7-3(4) (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-17 (1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 503(c) (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(g) (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-
62(3) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.20(A) (Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1044 (West 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1604 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-
16(b) (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-9-60(c) (Law. Co-op. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 47-3-20 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-6-201(b) (1984); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.14D (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-16 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1864(b)
(1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-642B (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.140 (1987); W.
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the lead of the Model Business Corporation Act85 and the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act, 6 all of these statutes empower the
corporation's board of directors to determine the payment terms for
subscriptions, unless the subscription specifies terms. Most of these
statutes87 require that directors' calls for payment must be uniform88
as to all shares of the same class, or as to shares of the same series. 9
The statutes in a few states9" specify the notice to be given in connec-
tion with the call, thereby settling the conflict in the case law as to
whether notice is required when the subscription, the corporation's
articles of incorporation, or its bylaws make no mention of it.9 The
noticeable impact of these statutes is an almost complete absence of
cases involving calls in recent years.92
B. Corporate Remedies in the Event of Default
With the exception of California and Iowa, all states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have statutes specifying corporate remedies in the
VA. CODE § 31-1-80 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.13(2) (West 1957); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-
114(b) (1987); Oregon Business Corporation Act, ch. 52, § 37(2), 1987 Or. Laws 43, 51.
The Delaware provision cited above, section 163, as well as the Kansas and Oklahoma
provisions, empowers directors to demand payment for unpaid shares. Similar language in an
earlier Delaware statute was applied by the court in Louisiana Oil Exploration Co. v. Raskob, 32
Del. 564, 127 A. 713 (1925), to an unpaid subscription for shares.
85. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 17 (1969).
86. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.20(b) (1984).
87. The following statutes do not require that calls be uniform: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-342(a) (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 163 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6413
(1981); MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 22 (Law. Co-op. 1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.20(A) (Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1044 (West 1986).
88. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 6.20(b) (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-605B
(1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-26-1(b) (Bums 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-6-201(b) (1984);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-642B (1985); and Oregon Business Corporation Act, ch. 52, § 37(2),
1987 Or. Laws 43, 51, require that calls be "uniform so far as practicable.'
89. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT § 6.20(b) (1984), and the statutes in the following
states, permit the subscription agreement to state that calls will not be uniform: ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 64-605B (1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.051(3)(b) (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-
83(c)(2) (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-26-1(b) (Bums 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-3(4)(b)
(West Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-6-201(b) (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-642B
(1985); Oregon Business Corporation Act, ch. 52, § 37(2), 1987 Or. Laws 43, 51.
90. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-342(a) (West 1987) (notice per bylaws; otherwise
reasonable); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 163 (1983) (written notice at least 30 days prior to
required payment); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-202(c)(2) (1985) (10 days written
notice); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 22 (Law. Co-op. 1979) (notice mailed at least seven days
before payment is due); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-3(4)(c) (West Supp. 1987) (30 days notice):
OKI.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1044 (West 1986) (same as Delaware); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1604 (Purdon 1967) (personal or mailed notice at least 30 days before payment is due).
91. The cases are discussed in 4 W. FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 1816.
92. See, however, Doyle v. Chladek, 240 Or. 598, 403 P.2d 381 (1965), involving the date on
which a call was deemed to have occurred for purposes of calculating interest.
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event of default in the payment of any call.9 3 Almost all of these stat-
utes, 94 the Model Business Corporation Act,95 and the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act,96 empower the corporation in the event of
default to collect the amount owed as any other debt.9" A number of
statutes authorize the corporation to sell the shares subject to the sub-
scription as an alternative to a debt action.9 8 The Revised Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act99 provides as an alternative to a debt action that
the corporation may rescind the subscription (unless the subscription
93. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-34 (1980); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.093 (1985); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 10-017C (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-605D (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-4-
103(3)-(4) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-342(b) (West Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 164 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-315(b) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.051(4) (West
1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-83(d) (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. ACT. § 415-17 (1985); IDAHO
CODE § 30-1-17 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 6.20 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-26.1(d) (West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6414 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 271A.085(2) (Baldwin 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:71E-:71G (West 1969); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 505(4)-(5) (1981); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-206(c)
(1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 24 (Law. Co-op. 1979); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(307)
(Callaghan 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.403(4) (West 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-31
(1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.175(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-603(3)
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2016 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.220(2) (1967); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 293-A:17(II) (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-3(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1987);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-17 (Supp. 1987); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 503(d) (McKinney 1986);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(i) (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-62(4)-(5) (1985); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.20(B) (Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1045 (West 1986); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1605 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-16(b) (1985); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-9-60(d)-(e) (Law. Co-op. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-3-20 to -21 (1983);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-6-201(d) (1984); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.14D (Vernon 1980);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-16 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1864(b) (1984); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-642D to -642E (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.140 (1987); W. VA. CODE
§ 31-1-80 (1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.13(2) (West 1957); WYo. STAT. § 17-1-114(b) (1987):
Oregon Business Corporation Act, ch. 52, § 37(4), 1987 Or. Laws 43, 51.
94. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 24 (Law. Co-op. 1979) empowers the treasurer of the
corporation to sell the subscription at public auction in the event of default. If the proceeds from
such sale are less than the subscriber's debt, the corporation then may bring an action at law for
the deficiency.
95. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 17 (1969).
96. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.20(d) (1984).
97. Connecticut and North Carolina recognize as an alternative the right of the corporation
to sue for breach of the contract of subscription. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-342(b) (West
Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(i) (1982). Such result also apparently obtained under LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:71C (West 1969). See Moss v. Guarisco, 409 So.2d 323 (La. Ct. App.
1982) (granting corporation right to specifically enforce a subscription).
98. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-342(b) (West Supp. 1987) (unless the subscription provides
otherwise); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 164 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6414 (1981): LA. REV.
STAr. ANN. § 12:71E-:71F (West 1969) (unless the subscription provides otherwise): MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 21.200(307)(1)(b) (Callaghan 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.220(2) (1967)
(sufficient to pay subscriber's debt); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-3(5)(b) (West Supp. 1987): OHIo
RE-V. CoDE ANN. § 1701.20B (Anderson 1985); OKI.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1045 (West 1986):
PA. STATr. ANN. tit. 15, § 1605 (Purdon 1967).
99. RI-SID MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.20(d) (1984).
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provides otherwise) and sell the shares if the debt remains unpaid
more than twenty days after written demand for payment by the cor-
poration. A few statutes Io° authorize rescission as an alternative to
action on the debt. Finally, a few statutes, as an alternative to a debt
action, authorize the board of directors to declare the subscription and
all previous payments forfeited. 01
A large number of statutes'0 2 have adopted the provisions in section
17 of the Model Business Corporation Act related to forfeitures: That
the bylaws may prescribe penalties for failure to pay calls; that a pen-
alty working a forfeiture can only be declared if the amount due
remains unpaid twenty days after written demand therefor; and that if
shares are sold because of a forfeiture, any excess of the proceeds over
the amount due shall be paid to the subscriber. 103 Four statutes per-
mit the subscription agreement to prescribe penalties to pay calls;
another permits penalties stated in the agreement, the articles of incor-
poration, or the bylaws.10 5 Finally, one statute 06 authorizes the cor-
poration to forfeit a subscription if the corporation is unable to collect
the amount due within six months after default.
The most significant recent litigation related to corporate remedies
has, not surprisingly, dealt with forfeitures. The court in Sweeney v.
100. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(I)(c) (Callaghan 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-3(5)(c)
(West Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(i)(3) (1982).
101. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:71E (West 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.403(4)(a)
(West 1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 503(d) (McKinney 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-
62(4) (1985) (each statute requires prior notice to the subscriber: 15 days in Louisiana; 20 days in
Minnesota; 30 days in New York). NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.220(2) (1967) states no penalty
causing a forfeiture of a subscription may be declared unless the amount due remains unpaid for
thirty days after written demand. It is not clear who is authorized to declare such a penalty.
102. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-34 (1980); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.093 (1985); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 7-4-103(3)-(4) (1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-315(b) (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-17
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-17 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 6.20 (Smith-Hurd 1985);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.085(2) (Baldwin 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 13A,
§ 505(4)-(5) (1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-31 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.175(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1987) (provides only 60 days notice and does not provide for disbursements of excess upon
sale); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-603(3) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2016 (1983); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 293-A:17(II) (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-17 (Supp. 1987) (30 days notice);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-16 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-9-60(d)-(e) (Law. Co-op. 1986); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-3-20 to -21 (1983); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.14D (Vernon
1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-16 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1864(b) (1984); WASH.
REV. CODE § 23A.08.140 (1985); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-80 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.13(2)
(West 1957); WYO. STAT. § 17-1-114(b) (1987).
103. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT § 17 (1969).
104. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-017C (1977); FI.A. STAT. ANN. § 607.051(4) (West 1977):
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-83(d) (1982); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 503(d) (McKinney 1986)
(penalties not amounting to forfeiture).
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-642D (1985).
106. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-206(c) (1985).
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Bridal Fair, Inc. 107 held invalid a director's resolution stating that fail-
ure of shareholders to tender payment in cash for additional stock
within thirty days from the date of resolution would result in forfei-
ture of all rights. The court said such resolution violated statutory
language identical to the Model Business Corporation Act section
stated above.'0 8
VII. SUBSCRIBERS' DEFENSES TO LIABILITY
ON SUBSCRIPTIONS
Subscribers sued for unpaid subscriptions generally are entitled to
defenses available in any contract action."0 9 Subscription cases present
special problems in the application of the following defenses:
A. Noncompliance with Federal or State Securities Laws
Compliance with applicable securities laws may be an explicit con-
dition to the enforcement of the subscription." 0  However, even if the
subscription is silent, the courts"' have permitted the subscriber, as
the beneficiary of the registration requirements, to assert that the sub-
scription was void even though the corporation could not use such
defense.' 12
B. Fraud in the Inducement of the Subscriptions
The expansion in federal and state securities law remedies for fraud
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities has significantly
reduced the number of such cases involving common law fraud princi-
ples. Nevertheless, enough recent litigation involves the area to merit
107. 195 Neb. 166. 237 N.W.2d 138 (1976).
108. Sweeney, 237 N.W.2d at 140.
In Brown v. United Community Nat'l Bank, 282 F. Supp. 781. 784 (D.D.C. 1968). the court
held the Model Act language inapplicable to a subscription for stock of a bank. In the absence of
statute, the court upheld a directors' resolution forfeiting subscription rights when the tender was
one day late.
109. E.g., Lex v. Selway Steel Corp.. 203 Iowa 792, 206 N.W. 586. 594 (1925): 4 W.
FtErTCHER, supra note 18, § 1875.
State statutes have few provisions relating to defenses. See N.C. Gt.N. S-rAvr. § 55-43(f) (1982)
which provides that it generally is no defense to enforcement of a preincorporation subscription
that no notice was given to the subscriber of his other rights to participate in selecting the first
directors of the corporation.
110. See, c g.. Scholz Homes. Inc. v. Larson, 411 F.2d 342. 345 (7th Cir. 1969).
111. E.g., General Life of Mo. Inv. Corp. v. Shamburger. 546 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1976):
Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co.. 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 344 U.S. 856 (1952).
112. A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp.. 312 U.S. 38, modified. 63 Idaho 20. 115
P.2d 928 (1941).
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a brief summary of the area.' 1 3
A subscription induced by the fraud of corporate agents is not void,
but is voidable at the option of the subscriber on discovery of the fraud
if the subscriber elects to disaffirm the subscription within a reasonable
time." 4 Rescission, either by notice to the corporation or by filing a
suit to rescind, is required before the subscriber can rely on the fraud
as grounds for rescission," 5 or in most states as a defense to an action
to collect unpaid subscriptions." 6 A subscriber cannot rescind for
fraud if he or she is guilty of laches either in discovering the fraud or
in repudiating the subscription after discovery,' 17 or if he or she rati-
fies the subscription with knowledge of the fraud."' In addition, some
courts, relying on the trust fund doctrine,' hold that a subscriber
cannot rescind for fraud if the corporation has entered into bank-
ruptcy, liquidation, or receivership before notice of rescission was
given. 1 0 Other courts permit rescission in such circumstances but
hold it ineffective against creditors extending credit after the subscrip-
tion was accepted.''
C. Nonfulfillment of Conditions
Subscribers 22 frequently have asserted that their obligations under
a subscription are impliedly or expressly contingent upon the occur-
rence of a specific event. Courts have often held that preincorporation
113. See Berg. v. King-Cola, Inc., 227 Cal. App. 2d 338, 38 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1964) (action for
rescission of subscription fraudulently induced); Guynn v. Shulters, 223 Miss. 232, 78 So. 2d 114,
119 (1955) (Blue Sky law inapplicable; damage action for fraud on stock subscription); Skierka v.
Skierka Bros., Inc., 629 P.2d 214, 218-19 (Mont. 1981) (subscription fraudulently induced by
virtue of Montana statute); Ryan v. Collins, 496 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (action for
rescission of subscription fraudulently induced).
114. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 45, at 785.
115. E.g., Ryan v. Collins, 496 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
116. 4 W. FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 1681. California courts hold that if no affirmative
relief is sought (i.e., the fraud is used only as a defense), the subscriber need not give notice of
rescission. E.g., California Credit & Collection Corp. v. Randall, 76 Cal. App. 321, 244 P. 958
(1926).
117. 4 W. FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 1697.
118. Id. § 1702.
119. Under the trust fund theory, corporate assets, including stock subscriptions, constitute a
trust fund for the benefit of creditors. The theory has been substantially repudiated. H. HENN &
J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 431-32 (1983).
120. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 45, at 787 n.26; see also In re Stirling Homex Corp., 579
F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1978) (defrauded shareholders subordinated in event of bankruptcy to general
creditors), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979).
121. See 4 W. FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 1710.
122. On occasion, the corporation raises the issue to defeat the subscribers' status as a
shareholder. See, e.g., Berkowitz v. Linden Towers Coop. No. 5, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 919, 231
N.Y.S.2d 85 (1962).
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subscriptions are subject to implied conditions that the corporation
formed will not be materially different from the one contemplated in
the subscription 123 and that the corporation will not be defectively
formed. 1 4  Most courts 125  construing express conditions have
attempted to ascertain the parties' intent as to whether the condition is
a condition precedent (with the consequence that until the occurrence
of the condition the subscriber is not a shareholder and not liable), or
is a condition subsequent 26 (with the consequence that until the
occurrence of the condition the subscriber is a shareholder and is lia-
ble on the subscription). As the commentators observe, 2 7 this process
does not explicitly weigh the interests of creditors and other subscrib-
ers against the interests of the subscriber, and consequently produces
seemingly inconsistent results. 2 8 Finally, even if the condition is
interpreted to be a condition precedent, a court may still conclude that
the subscribers' conduct indicated an implied waiver of the condi-
tion. 129 If such conduct was performed with knowledge that the con-
dition had not been fulfilled, the subscriber would again be liable on
123. See discussion of cases in Cataldo, Conditions in Subscriptions for Shares, 43 VA. L. REv.
353, 354-56 (1957). Another group of cases holds that the abandonment of the corporate
enterprise by the promoters, at least where creditor's rights are not affected, discharges
subscribers to stock. See 4 W. FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 1755. The theory underlying such a
decision is failure of consideration, rather than nonfulfillment of an implied condition. See, e.g..
Shield v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 202 S.W 211 (Tex. Ct. App. 1918).
124. 4 W. FLETCHER, supra note 18, §§ 1897-1898.
Another condition frequently implied in the past was that the authorized share capital be fully
subscribed. See id. § 1560. Modern statutes no longer require subscriptions for stated amounts of
capital, and thus there no longer is any basis from which to imply the condition.
125. Compare Wood v. Roy Lapidus, Inc., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 761. 413 N.E.2d 345, 347
(1980) with Rodziewicz v. Giguere, 5 Conn. App. 293, 497 A.2d 1025 (1985) (explicit condition
(promise) to form corporation and convey stock within 60 days of subscription; corporation
abandoned; subscriber not liable on subscription, but no mention of conditions). See also
Sheridan v. McBaine, 660 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (the court resolves a question of the
effect of nonfulfillment of a condition precedent through the use of joint venture law).
126. Conditions other than conditions precedent may also be referred to as "special terms" or
as "'independent obligations." See 4 W. FiLETCHER, supra note 18, § 1530.
127. E.g., Cataldo, supra note 123, at 358-65.
128. Compare Cornhusker Dev. & Inv. Group, Inc. v. Knecht, 180 Neb. 873, 146 N.W.2d
567 (1966) (subscription independent of agreement to build rest home; subscription enforced
against subscriber) with Texas City Hotel Corp. v. Wilkenfeld, 410 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966) (special term requiring construction of community hotel in Texas City breached:
subscriber not liable). See also Wood v. Roy Lapidus, Inc.. 10 Mass. App. Ct. 761. 413 N.E.2d
345 (1980) (independent obligation: shareholder entitled to shares subject to obligation),
Berkowitz v. Linden Towers Coop. No. 5. 35 Misc. 2d 919. 231 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1962)
(subscriptions for 90% of dwelling units was a condition precedent: subscribers vere not
shareholders).
129. Cataldo, supra note 123. at 367-68 (1957): see also Eggan v. Simonds. 34 II1. App 2d
316. 181 N.E.2d 354 (1962) (subscriber who deliberately prevents fulfillment of condition is
estopped from raising defense).
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the subscription.13
D. Release
Under the common law rules governing such events in most juris-
dictions, 1 3 1 a corporation may release a subscriber from liability on his
or her subscription only if, one, all shareholders have expressly 32 or
impliedly 3 3 approved the release; two, the release would not be detri-
mental to creditors; 33 and three, the release is supported by adequate
consideration. 135 These rules do not prevent a bona fide compromise
of a dispute between the corporation and a subscriber as to liability on
a subscription. 13
6
Only two states, Arizona 137 and North Carolina,138 govern releases
by statute. Both empower the board of directors, absent contrary
stated restrictions, 39 to determine whether and upon what terms the
obligation of any subscribers may be released, settled, or compro-
mised.""4 The North Carolina statutes go on to treat a release
accepted by the corporation as the equivalent of a purchase by the
corporation of the shares in question, and thus subject to the North
130. 4 W. FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 1525.
131. Only two states have statutory provisions related to release of subscriptions. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-017D (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(k) (1982); supra text
accompanying note 133.
132. E.g., Little Switz. Brewing Co. v. Oxley, 156 W. Va. 800, 197 S.E.2d 301, 306 (1973); cf.
Cerami v. Dignazio, 283 Pa. Super. 424, 424 A.2d 881, 886 (1981) (court affirmed chancellor's
determination that parties had not mutually agreed to a release).
133. E.g., Sobol v. Avila, 480 P.2d 116, 120 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
134. E.g., id. at 120; 4 W. FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 1747; see also Denniston & Co. v.
Jackson, 468 So. 2d 170, 174 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (court invalidated an attempted cancellation
of a subscription relying on an Alabama statute to protect existing creditor).
The cases are in conflict on whether creditors extending credit subsequent to the release are
included in the limitation. 4 W. FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 1748.
135. E.g., Wood v. Roy Lapidus, Inc., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 761, 413 N.E.2d 345, 348 (1980);
Murphy v. Panton, 96 Wash. 637, 165 P. 1074 (1917).
136. See Annotation, Validity of Release, Cancelation, or Compromise of Unpaid Subscription
for Stock by Corporation or Its Representative, 101 A.L.R. 231, 259-62 (1936). The corporation's
ability to enter such compromises must be carefully distinguished from a creditor's ability to
compromise the liability of less than all of delinquent subscribers in a corporation. See Davis v.
Olson, 4 Wash. App. 390, 392, 482 P.2d 795, 797 (1971) (trust fund doctrine required creditor to
prorate claims among all delinquent subscribers).
137. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-017D (1977).
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-143(k) (1982).
139. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-017D (1977) states "[u]nless otherwise provided in the
subscription .... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(k) (1982) states "[u]nless otherwise restricted by
the charter or bylaws .... "
140. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-83(e) (1982) (empowers the directors to compromise
disputes arising out of a subscription).
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Carolina restrictions on repurchases of shares. 4 ' While these statutes
represent a minority view,142 they eliminate a long-time "quirk of the
law"' 14 3 and thus merit emulation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Twenty years ago I argued as part of an assessment of the financial
provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act that the Model Act
subscription provision should be reformulated.' 4 4 It is, of course, dis-
appointing to discover that very little legislative action has been taken
in the meantime either by the drafters of the Revised Model Act or by
legislatures. Perhaps that is because most of the controversies involv-
ing subscriptions appear to involve small businesses, and possibly in
turn, practitioners who do not specialize in corporate law. Those
speculations would only strengthen the argument for statutory reform
to include provisions that operate as a better road map through such
transactions and fill likely gaps in such agreements. Such provisions
can surely be justified as reducing the costs of uncertainty and litiga-
tion imposed on such enterprises by the current system of laws.
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(k) (1982).
142. Two other states, Arkansas and Tennessee, for many years also had provisions like those
of North Carolina. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-203E (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-504(e)
(1984). Both states recently adopted the Revised Model Act provisions, thereby eliminating the
earlier relese provisions. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-605 (1980); Ti.NN. CODE ANN. § 48-6-201
(1984).
143. H. BAt LANTINE, supra note 45, at 460. Ballantine felt that the financial effects of a
release were equivalent to those of a repurchase of shares. Id. at 459-60.
144. See Kummert, The Financial Provisions of the New Washington Business Corporation Act,.
41 WASH. L. REv. 207, 241-42 (1966).
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